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I.       Introduction 
 
           In the last years, because of the growing globalization international 
outsourcing, which is understood as buying of production parts from an 
independent foreign supplier, becomes an important part in firms’ management to 
reorganize the production process.1 Attended with this observation many people 
fear the wide consequences for the domestic labor market, especially for ordinary 
worker. Due to the possibility of substitution these consequences can be the loss of 
employment or a reduction of the wage and therefore a lower income.2 An 
important role in this situation plays the labor market structure and the existence of 
a trade union, which can use its power to avoid a dramatic wage decrease and/or 
bargain with the firm over employment guarantees. 
 This paper presents a theoretical framework to analyze the effects of 
committed international outsourcing on worker’s income, if workers are represented 
by a labor union.3 Thus, we assume an imperfect domestic labor market, i.e. a firm 
and a labor union will negotiate over worker’s remuneration, while we distinguish 
two kinds of negotiation. In the first part, we follow the classical bargaining 
approach, where only the wage will be determined, while in the second part we 
assume an alternative approach where the firm and the labor union bargain over 
wage and profit sharing.  
 Due to the actuality and importance of this topic, there is a growing 
literature relating to the effect of outsourcing or globalization on wages and 
employment. From a theoretical point of view, Danthine and Hunt (1994) show that 
due to globalization an intensified product market competition and due to that lower 
profits  occur,  which  lead  to  a  wage  moderating  effect  in  unionized  sectors.  A  
similar finding is presented by Glass and Saggi (2001). In opposite, Naylor (1998, 
                                               
1  Empirical studies like Hummels et al. (1998, 2001) or Yeats (2001) show the increase of 
imported intermediate goods over the last 30 years. 
2   For an overview concerning the debate on employment effects due to outsourcing, see 
Freeman (1995) and Bhagwati et al. (2004). 
3  In the committed case, outsourcing takes place before wage bargaining. Thus the external 
procurement is seen as a long-term contract that fixes the amount of outsourcing. See e.g. 
Perry (1997) for an overview about the relationship between outsourcing and wage 
bargaining.   
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1999) find that domestic unionized worker can gain by globalization in terms of 
higher wages and employment, since the total production expands if new markets 
can be served by the firms. Lommerud et al. (2009) showed that higher market 
integration favours outsourcing to low cost countries and increases the wage due to 
a less elastic labor demand. The reason is that the used inputs are complements and 
thus for a given amount of outsourcing the loss of the labor union of a higher wage 
will decrease. However, there are also studies as Skaksen and Sorensen (2001) or 
Koskela and Stenbacka (2009) which show that the wage effect of foreign direct 
investments or outsourcing is a priori ambiguous. In Skaksen and Sorensen (2001) 
the degree of substitution between the activities in the home country and abroad is 
decisive for the domestic wage effect. If the activities are good substitutes, than a 
lower domestic wage results and domestic employment lose, while a higher base 
wage  occur  for  complementary  activities  and  thus  employment  gains.  In  Koskela  
and Stenbacka (2009), the wage effect of outsourcing depends on the labor unions 
relative bargaining power, where it lowers (increases) the wage if the labor unions 
bargaining power sufficiently high (low).  
 Also in empirical studies the wage effect of international outsourcing is 
analyzed. In an early study Feentsra and Hanson (1999) show the wage reducing 
effect for low-skilled workers in the United States over the period 1979-1990. 
Senses (2010), also using U.S. data, provides empirical evidence of an increasing 
wage elasticity and thus for a wage moderating effect of outsourcing.4 Focusing on 
German data Geishecker and Görg (2008) identify winners and losers from 
international  outsourcing  depending  on  the  skills  of  the  workers.  Although  the  
German labor market is characterized by relatively rigid wages, there can be a wage 
moderation effect of outsourcing, if it improves the outside option of the firm. The 
authors find that this will happen for low-skilled workers, which receive a lower 
wage with increasing outsourcing. In contrast, the high-skilled wage increases. This 
is reasonable with a higher relative high-skilled demand if the low-skilled intensive 
parts are outsourced.  
 As  seen  above  the  theoretical  studies  focusing  on  pure  wage  effects  of  
international outsourcing by assuming that only the wage is determined by the 
                                               
4  Similar findings are shown in earlier studies by Slaughter (2001) and Hasan et al. (2007). 
 3
bargaining between the firm and the labor union. However, not only the wage, but 
additional components as bonus payments or profit sharing can be the result of 
those bargaining.5 The idea behind the incorporation of profit sharing in a 
compensation scheme is to stimulate the motivation and identification with the firm 
and thus increases productivity.6 Using this assumption, we extend the above 
mentioned literature by implementing profit sharing as a part of the compensation 
scheme.7 Distinguish the cases, where the union and firm negotiate only over 
wages, and as discussed in the political debate over wage and profit share, allow us 
to divide between a wage and income effect. Thus, our central research question is: 
Is there a justified fear of income loss of unionized worker?   
In our analysis, we find that in the case where the firm and the labor union 
bargain only over the base wage, outsourcing will reduce (increase) workers 
income, if the labor union’s bargaining power is sufficiently high (low). In contrast, 
if the labor union and firm bargain simultaneously over wage and profit share, 
outsourcing will increase workers income, if the marginal costs of outsourcing are 
lower than the domestic outside option. 
Knowing the effect of income respectively wage effects, we can due to 
comparative statics show, in which way the degree of labor market imperfection, 
i.e. union’s bargaining power, affect domestic outsourcing demand under the 
different remuneration schemes will. Here we find, that the outsourcing demand 
under a pure wage bargaining system will become higher (lower) if the labor 
union’s bargaining power is sufficiently high (low), while under a simultaneously 
wage and profit share bargaining system the amount of outsourcing decreases with 
a stronger labor union.  
                                               
5  Empirical studies as Pendleton et al. (2001) show that profit sharing is an often used 
compensation scheme in many OECD countries. For further evidence regarding the incidence 
of profit sharing, see also Estrin et al. (1997) and Conyon and Freeman (2004). 
6  However, empirical studies show that the productivity effects are ambiguous. For an 
increasing effect on productivity, see Cable and Fitzroy (1980), while Jones and Pliskin 
(1991) and Kruse (1993) demonstrate negative productivity effects of profit sharing. 
7  There are some studies, who analyze the implementation of profit sharing in collective 
bargaining, e.g. Holmlund (1990) and Jerger and Michaelis (1999). Concerning the efficiency 
property, Pohjola (1987) and Anderson and Devereux (1989) show that also without an 
employment determination the outcome of a collective bargaining is efficient by introducing 
bargaining over wages and profit share. However, all studies abstract from outsourcing. 
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We proceed as follows. Section II presents the time sequences of decisions 
in terms of outsourcing, employment, wage formation and profit sharing. Section III 
investigates solving the model in terms of domestic labor demand, and bargaining 
process in terms of wage formation and both wage formation and profit sharing and 
also strategic outsourcing. Finally, we present conclusions in section IV.     
 
 
II.    Basic Framework  
 
  We assume that in our economy there is a representative firm which 
produces the final good using two activities. The relationship of these activities can 
be represented by the Cobb-Douglas production function  
 
  ?? YXF ??   with 10 ??? ??  ,                              (1) 
 
where X  and Y  characterize the two input goods. We assume that the X -activity 
must take place in-house, whereas the Y -activity can be produced in house or 
outsourced. For simplicity, we assume a linear technology in every input 
production, where for one unit of the input good, one unit of labor, respectively 
outsourced input is needed. Therefore, we specify the production function for the 
input goods as 
 
  XLX ?  
  MLY Y ?? , 
 
where XL   and  YL  present the labor demand in the specific activity and M  the 
amount of outsourcing.  
  We further assuming, that labor in both activities is homogenous and that 
the overall workforce YX LLL ??  will be represented by a labor union and thus. 
This assumption assures that no wage discrimination between the activities can be 
realized by the firm. 
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The structure of actions can be interpreted as sequential decisions on three 
stages. On the first stage, the representative firm commits to the amount of 
outsourcing before the bargaining process and domestic labor demand. After the 
firm has decided about outsourcing, the firm and the labor union bargain over i) the 
wage level or ii) over base wage and profit sharing. Since the firm has the right-to-
manage, it determines the employment concerning its labor demand after knowing 
the bargaining results. We summarize these timing decisions in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1:  Time sequences  
        
 
Stage 1  Stage 2        Stage 3               
 
   outsourcing M          bargaining process       labor demand L  
       (wage w  or wage w  
       and profit sharing ? )  
      
 
The decisions at each stage are analyzed by using backward induction. 
 
 
III.    Solving the model  
  
In the ext parts, we solve the presented timing structure. We first, focus in 
the third stage by deriving the labor demand in both activities for given outsourcing. 
After that, we model the bargaining process by distinguish the mentioned two 
alternative approaches. While in the first, the firm and the labor union bargain only 
over the wage level, in the second approach, both parties negotiate about the wage 
and a profit share. Finally, on the first stage we solving for the optimal strategic 
outsourcing. 
 
III.1.   3rd stage: Domestic Labor Demand 
 
  The firm decides on domestic labor to maximize the profit function 
 
 6
? ? ? ? ? ? ?MfLLwMLLMax YXYX
LL YX
????? ???
;
,                              (2) 
 
by taking outsourcing, M , as given. For the cost of outsourcing, ? ?Mf , we assume 
that there are some other costs associated with outsourcing such as the price of the 
intermediate goods. Such costs could be costs for transport, which are exponential 
increasing  with  higher  outsourcing.  To  allow for  an  exponential  cost  increase,  we  
model a quadratic cost function, ? ? 2
2
1 cMMf ? , 0?c , with ? ? 0' ?Mf  and 
? ? 0'' ?Mf . As one can see from (2), the he firm maximizes profits with respect to 
XL  and YL .  This  leads  to  the  standard  result,  that  employment  is  set  where  
marginal productivity equals the wage rate. From these first-order conditions we get 
as the labor demand for given outsourcing8  
 
                     ??
?
??
?
?? ?? ????
?
??
?
??? 11
1
1
1
wLX ,                                              (3a) 
       MwLY ???? ??
?
????
? ??
?
??
?
?? ?? 1
1
11
1
.                                          (3b) 
 
Thus, the overall domestic labor demand is  
 
  ? ? MwLLL YX ???????? ??????
?
??
?
??
?
?? ???? 111
1
.                      (4) 
                                                                                                      
As one can see from equation (4), domestic labor demand is a negative function of 
both wage and the amount of outsourcing, where the substitutability of low-skilled 
labour and international outsourcing is consistent with empirical evidence, e.g. 
presented by Görg and Hanley (2005).  
 Since we focus on wage bargaining, the labor union keeps in mind the 
reaction of labor demand concerning wage changes, while the degree of labor 
                                               
8  Notice, that also in the presence of bargained profit sharing, where the profit of firms owner is 
? ? ?? ??1 , we yield the same labor demand reactions, since it works as a profit tax. Since this 
kind of tax is neutral, the domestic labor demand is independent of bargained profit sharing.
  
 7
demand reaction is presented by the wage elasticity of labor demand. In the 
presence of outsourcing the wage elasticity of the labor, 
L
w
w
L
?
???? , can be written 
as  
 
  ?
?
??
?
? ???? L
M1
1
1
??? >1.                                                              (5) 
 
Notice that the wage elasticity (5) depends on wage and outsourcing. For the effects 
of these variables, we find 0
1
1 ?????? L
M
ww
?
???  and 0?? LM
?? . Therefore, 
with higher domestic wage and higher outsourcing labor demand becomes more 
elastic. In the absence of outsourcing, the wage elasticity ??? ???? 1
1
0M  is 
constant and smaller than in the presence of outsourcing.9   
 
III.2.   2nd stage: Bargaining Process  
           
  On this stage, the firm and a labor union bargain over i) the wage level or ii) 
over the wage and profit sharing. We distinguish between these scenarios since both 
are possible in observed bargaining rounds.10 
  The outcome of the bargaining process is assumed to be determined by the 
Nash-Bargaining-Solution, where the Nash-Product is defined as 
 
  ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ????? 100 ˆ? UU .   
 
In the above notation, 0U  and 0?  are the disagreement payoffs for the union 
respectively the firm. In the case of a disagreement, there is no production, 
                                               
9  These findings are in line with empirical evidence as shown by Slaughter (2001), Hasan et al. 
(2007) and Senses (2010). 
10  While in most European countries as Austria, Germany, Sweden or Finland the wage is the 
central determinant in a bargaining between the union and the firm, in France there exists a 
obligatory profit share system for firms with more than 50 worker, while in the bargaining 
round,  the  firm  and  the  labor  union  determine  the  details  as  the  calculation  formula  or  the  
duration. See also Pendleton et al. (2001). 
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implying that every union member get the outside option. Formally this is expressed 
as bNU ??0 , where b  captures the exogenous minimum income for labor union 
members N . On the other side, due to no production, the firm loses its investment 
in outsourcing, which means that the firm has an incentive for an agreement due to 
its loss ? ?Mf??0? .  
 
III.2.1 Parties Bargaining Only Over Wages  
 
 Assuming that only the wage will be determined, we can express the 
bargaining problem as 
 
? ? ? ? ?? ?? ????? 100 ˆ?max UUw . 
 
To describe the preferences of the labor union we model an utilitaristic union 
utility ? ? ? ? ? ?LNbuLwuU ?????  in case of agreement, where the individual utility 
u  is linear in income, i.e ? ? wwu ?  and ? ? bbu ? . Combining this with the unions 
outside option 0U , we can express the union rent as ? ?LbwUUU ???? 0 .  
Also the bargaining rent of the firm 0??? ??  can be expressed explicitly. 
Since the profit in case of agreement is ? ?MfwLF ????  and the disagreement 
profit ? ?Mf??0? , we get as the rent wLF ??? . 
Maximizing the Nash-Product (see also chapter 7 in Cahuc and Zylberberg, 
2004), the first order condition can be written as ? ? ?
??? www U
U ???? 10? .11 
Using our earlier results we have  
    
              ?
?
??
?
?
???????? bw
w
wbwL
L
U
U ww ?11  ,                         (6a) 
and         
                                               
11  For notational convenience, we use the subscript as a characterization for the first derivative, 
i.e. ww ??? /?? .  
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   ? ? LMw
w
/1
1
???
??? ??
??
?
? .                         (6b) 
 
            Using these expressions and the wage elasticity of labor as well, the first-
order condition of the Nash-product can be solved to  
 
? ? bMwAw ?? ?,, ,                    (7)                                                          
 
which corresponds to the standard result that the wage consist of the outside option 
and a mark-up bigger than one. As one can see, in our framework, the mark-up 
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? 1111
11 ??????????
????????? ????????
?????????A  depends on the relative 
bargaining power of the labor union ? , outsourcing M  and wage w . Therefore, 
equation (7) is an implicit formulation.  
 Knowing the bargained wage, we can distinguish the extreme cases of 
monopoly labor union, which set the wage independent from the firm, and the 
absence of a labor union, where the firm sets the wage. The approach of a 
monopoly labor union is characterized by 1?? , where the wage is 
? ? bw ???? 11
?
? , while in the absence of bargaining power of the labor union 
bw ??0? .
12 
 For  answering  our  research  question  and  characterizing  the  wage  effect  of  
outsourcing, we now turn to a detailed analysis. Implicit differentiation of (7) with 
respect to outsourcing gives 
bA
bA
dM
dw
w
M
?? 1  and by substituting Awb /?  we can 
characterize the impact of international outsourcing on wage formation as   
 
                                               
12        Since 1?? , it is easy to see that the relative bargaining power of the labor union will have a 
positive effect on the mark-up. In the general case 10 ?? ?  this means 0??A .  
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A
wA
A
wA
dM
dw
w
M
?
?
1
 ,                                                       (8)                 
where 01 ??
A
wAw .13 
The outsourcing effect on the mark-up, 
A
wAM , is  a priori ambiguous and 
depends on the relationship of the relative bargaining power of the labor union, ? , 
and the outsourcing and labor ratio, LM / . For the impact of outsourcing on the 
mark-up, we find  
 
   ? ?? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?2/11
10
LM
ifAM ???????
???
??
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
??
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
??????
????? .       (9) 
 
Thus, for a sufficient strong (weak) labor market imperfection characterized by the 
relative bargaining power of the labor union, outsourcing has a wage moderating 
(wage increasing) effect. Therefore, to be more precisely, we have 0?MA  in the 
case of monopoly union, 1?? , and 0?MA  in the absence of wage bargaining.  
As above, we can also identify the wage effect of outsourcing in the extreme 
cases. Since with unilateral wage setting by the firm, the wage will be the lowest 
possible level, which is the exogenous outside alternative income, outsourcing has 
no wage effect, i.e.  0
0
?
??dM
dw . In contrast, in the case of monopoly labor union 
we find that 0
1
???MA , which gives that 0
1
?
??dM
dw .     
Concerning the more general case where both parties are endowed with a 
positive bargaining power, i.e. 10 ?? ? , we can summarize as 
                                               
13  For the detailed derivations see Appendix A. 
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         Proposition 1: If the firm and the labor union bargain only over the 
base wage, outsourcing will reduce (increase) workers income, if the 
labor union’s bargaining power is sufficiently high (low). 
 
A similar result is obtained by Koskela and Stenbacka (2009) in the model where 
profit sharing has not been analyzed.  
For the economic intuition we can identify two opposite mechanisms 
explaining the effects of the outsourcing on wage formation. First, with higher 
outsourcing the wage elasticity of labor demand (5) becomes more elastic. Since 
with a more elastic labor demand, a higher wage increases the utility loss of less 
employment. This mechanism on unions utility inducing discipline and thereby a 
less aggressive labor union, which means a lower wage mark-up. Second, as 
outsourcing and labor are substitutes with higher outsourcing firm’s profit is less 
depending on labor costs. Thus outsourcing moderates the profit-reducing effect 
?? /w  of a wage increase, which promotes a higher wage mark-up. As equation (9) 
reflects, the overall effect on the negotiated wage of increased outsourcing is a 
trade-off between these two forces, while the first effect dominates when the labor 
market imperfection  ?   is sufficiently strong.  
 
III.2.2  Simultaneous Bargaining Over Wage and Profit Share  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, there are several studies concerning the 
simultaneous negotiation about profit sharing and wages. However, these studies 
abstracted from strategic outsourcing.  
Before we formally analyze this bargaining process, we have to modify our 
objective function of the labor union and the firm. Since we assume that the union 
utility depends on income, now we have to write the utility in case of agreement as 
???? wLU , where ?  characterizes the share of profit which is distributed to the 
worker. Of course, also the profit of the firms owner will change. Now he get in the 
case of agreement ? ? ?? ??1 . Since the value of disagreements are the same as in 
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section III.2, i.e. bNU ??0  and ? ?Mf??0? , the rents are now represented by 
? ? ??????? LbwUUU 0  and ? ? ? ?Mf??? ??? 1 . In this setting the Nash-
Product has to be maximized concerning wage and profit share, i.e. 
??
?
? ??? 1
,
?max U
w
. As the first order conditions, we get 
 
   ? ? ?
??? www U
U ???? 10? ,                        (10a)  
and 
   ? ? ?
??? ??? ???? 10? U
U .                       (10b) 
 
Using ?? ?U  and ??? ??  from (10b) we have ?
?? ?? 1
U
. Putting this expression 
in (10a), we get wwU ???0 , where ? ? ? ?LbwLU ww ????? 1  and ? ?Lw ?? ??? 1 . 
Using these results, we obtain as the negotiated base wage in the presence of 
simultaneous negotiations with wage and profit sharing as  
 
    bw ? ,                                     (11) 
 
so that the negotiated  wage in the presence of negotiated profit sharing is equal to 
the exogenous outside option for labor union members.14  
            By comparing the negotiated wages (7) and (11) implies that the wage in the 
simultaneous wage and profit sharing-bargaining is smaller than (equal to) in the 
case without profit sharing negotiation if there is a positive (zero) relative 
bargaining power of the labor union. The intuition for this finding is relative simple, 
since the parties bargain over the distribution of the earned rent. If there is no labor 
union, the whole rent will be earned by the firm. Since, the rent is influence by the 
employment and the highest rent is realized with the highest employment, the firm 
decrease the paid wage to the lowest level, which is the outside option b . The same 
mechanism leads to the derived result (11) in the presence of simultaneous 
                                               
14  This corresponds to the well known results of Weitzman (1987).  
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bargaining of profit sharing and wage. However, in that case the negotiated profit 
share determines the distribution of the rent between the firm and the labor union.  
 Implementing (11) in ?
?? ?? 1
U
 and using the labor demand (3a) and (3b) 
we obtain as the bargained profit share 
 
  
? ?
? ? ? ?MfbMb
bMb
??????
???????
??????
??
??????
??
????
??????
??
?
??
?
??
??
??
?
??
?
??
??
1
1
111
111
.              (12) 
 
From (12) we see that in the absence of outsourcing the profit share corresponds to 
the relative bargaining power of the labor union, i.e. ?? ??0M ,
15 while  in  the  
presence of outsourcing the bargaining profit share is smaller than the relative 
bargaining power of the labor union, i.e.  ?? ??0M .  
As mentioned above, the profit share determines how the created rent 
associated with the lowest possible wage level. Therefore, one would expect that 
the distribution of the rent is driven by the relative bargaining power, where the 
share of the rent for every party equals its relative bargaining power. However, as 
shown in equation (12) this does not hold in our framework and the assumption of 
strategic outsourcing. The economic intuition for this result is the following. Since 
the amount of outsourcing is determined before the bargaining take place, the firm 
has an incentive for an agreement and to avoid the negative profit in being the costs 
associated with the outsourcing commitment. Thus the firm faces a weaker position 
as with zero-profits, where only the relative bargaining power is decisive for the 
distribution, and therefore it receives a lower share of the rent as its relative 
bargaining power  predict. 
Since the base wage is the exogenous outside option, in the case of 
simultaneous bargaining, the wage component isn’t affecting by outsourcing, which 
is different to our former analysis.  
                                               
15   For this standard result see also Holmlund (1990). 
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However to determine the income effect of outsourcing, we has to show the 
effect of outsourcing on the negotiation outcome. Here we find that (see Appendix 
B) 
 
             ? ?? ? 0
2
1
2 ???
??
?
??
? ?
??
?
MfbMV
bMVcM
M
?? ,                                                   (13) 
 
where ? ? 01111 ???? ??????
??
???? ??
?
??
?
??
??
bV  so that the bargained profit share 
depends positively on outsourcing.  
 However, our research question focuses on the income effect of outsourcing. 
For an employed individual the income under this kind of compensation scheme is 
L
b
*??? ??? , where the income effect of outsourcing can be formalized by  
 
  0
*
2
*
???
?
??
? ??
????
????
???
? ??????
M
LL
MLLMM
.                                  (14) 
 
Using the former results (4) and (13), we have 0??
?
M
?  and 0??
?
M
L . To determine 
the outsourcing effect on profit, we need the indirect profit function *? . Using the 
derived result, we find that ? ? ? ?MfMbb ????????? ??
??
???? ??
??
??
?
??
?
????? 111* 1  
and thus ? ?
M
Mfb
M ?
????
? *? .  As  this  formulation  shows,  under  the  assumption  that  
the marginal cost of outsourcing, ? ?
M
Mf
?
? ,   are  lower  than  the  domestic  marginal  
cost of labor, b ,  we  have   0
*
??
?
M
?  and therefore an unambiguous income 
increasing effect of outsourcing. 
We can summarize our findings as.   
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 Proposition 2: If the labor union and firm bargain simultaneously over 
wage and profit share, outsourcing will increase workers income, if the 
marginal costs of outsourcing are lower than the domestic outside 
option. 
  
As one can see from (14), outsourcing affects the income due to two working 
channels. The first part shows the increasing share effect, since every worker get a 
higher  share  of  the  per  capita  profit.  The  second  mechanism  is  shown  by  the  
expression in brackets. On the one side, higher outsourcing will increase the profit, 
if the marginal costs of outsourcing are lower than the domestic marginal costs of 
labor, which lead to a higher income. On the other side, higher outsourcing 
decreases the employment and thus increases the per capita profit. Due to these 
effects, an employment worker will benefit from higher outsourcing since the profit 
share the overall and per capita profit increase.   
  
III.3  Optimal Strategic Outsourcing 
 
So  far  we  restricted  our  self  to  a  short  run  analysis,  where  the  amount  of  
outsourcing is given respectively constant, while the firm has committed itself.  We 
now relax this point of view by exploring the initial stage of outsourcing decision 
and therefore focusing on a long run perspective, where the firm sets determines its 
investments into outsourced production. We can thus characterizing, in which way 
the equilibrium production mode is affected by the labor market characteristics 
concerning the relative bargaining power under the different bargaining structure.   
 
III.3.1 Optimal Outsourcing if Parties Bargaining only Over Wages  
 
Concerning the timing structure, presented in Section II, the representative 
firm has been assumed to commit to outsourcing to maximize profit (2) subject to 
domestic labor demand (4), and wage formation (7). As we showed above, the 
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indirect profit function is ? ? ? ?MfMww ????????? ??
??
???? ??
??
??
?
??
?
????? 111* 1 . 
Thus the firms optimizing problem can be characterized by  
 
  *max?
M
 s.t. ? ? bMwAw ?? ?,,  and ? ? 2
2
1 cMMf ?                         (15) 
 
Differentiating the indirect profit function gives as the first order condition  
 
    0
*
??????
?
YLdM
dwcMw
M
? .                                            (16) 
 
As equation (16) pointed out, the level of outsourcing depends on the used 
employment in activity Y  and on the labor market imperfection, which determines 
the wage effect (see equation (9)). As one can see from (16), that under 0?YL  and 
0/ ?dMdw  it follows that wcM ?  and the amount of outsourcing lies above the 
outsourcing level were domestic and foreign marginal costs are equal. Since 
outsourcing moderates the wage only in the presence of a sufficiently high union 
bargaining power, we can conclude that under 0?YL  strategic outsourcing is an 
increasing function of the labor market imperfection. Therefore, in the presence of a 
strong labor union, the firm reaps an additional benefit with higher outsourcing, by 
inducing a wage moderating effect.16 
We can summarize our finding as                
 
Proposition 3: If parties bargaining over wages, strategic outsourcing 
will become higher (lower) if the labor union’s bargaining power is 
sufficiently high (low). 
 
This result can be explained as follows. On the one hand, higher outsourcing 
increases  the  total  production  costs,  but  on  the  other  hand,  it  leads  to  a  wage  
moderates if the labor union sufficiently strong. Thus, outsourcing becomes an 
                                               
16  For a graphical argumentation see Koskela and Schöb (2009). 
 17
strategic instrument for the firm due to the saving of wage bill. As equation (16) 
characterized, the optimal amount of outsourcing is given, where but effects are 
equalized. However, if there is now employment in activity Y  ( 0?YL ) or now 
wage moderating effect, 0/ ?dMdw ,  than  we  get  the  usual  result,  where  the  
marginal costs have to be the same.  
The effect of unionization on domestic wage level is also presented in 
Lommerud et al. (2009). In contrast to our analysis, they find an outsourcing 
decreasing impact of the labor unions bargaining power, since higher outsourcing 
decreases firm’s marginal costs and thus the labor demand elasticity becomes less 
elastic,  which  lead  to  higher  wages.  This  results  from  the  assumption  of  
complementary inputs. As in our analysis, higher outsourcing decreases domestic 
labor, but due to the complementarily for the remaining domestic inputs, an 
additional  rent  due  to  higher  wages  can  be  realized  by  the  union.  Thus  the  major  
difference between the analyses results from different framework concerning the 
production technology.  
                          
III.3.2 Optimal Outsourcing if Parties Bargaining Over Wage and Profit Share 
 
Since in that scenario, the wage is set to the constant outside option, the 
indirect profit becomes ? ? ? ?MfMbb ????????? ??
??
???? ??
??
??
?
??
?
????? 111* 1 . 
Thus the firms problem is characterized by17 
 
  ? ? *1max ???
M
 s.t. ??? ?? .                                                             (17) 
 
Under the former derived results, we get as the first order condition  
? ? *
*
10 ???? ??
???
????
MM
, which can be simplified to  
 
                                               
17  According to (12) the profit share mark-up is ? ?MfbM
bM
??
??
*
*
? ?
? . 
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    ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? 011 ** ???
???????
?? ?????
M
cMb
M
.                    (18) 
 
Since 0* ???
? ??
M
 and 10 ?? ?  we see from (19) that cMb ? . This lies in contrast 
to the case, where the parties bargain only over wages, which means that the firm 
will choose an amount of outsourcing lower than the level, where the marginal costs 
of outsourcing equals the marginal cost of domestic labor. Comparing the optimal 
amount of outsourcing under the different bargaining approaches and the 
assumption wb ? , we can conclude from the conditions cMb ?  respectively 
cMw ? , that the bargained profit share approach leads to a lower investment in 
outsourced production. 
However, our focus is the impact of labor market imperfection. As one can 
see from (13), the increasing effect of outsourcing on profit sharing depends 
positively on the union’s bargaining power. Thus, the firm’s owner faces a higher 
incentive of lower outsourcing in the presence of a strong labor union to reap a 
higher share of the profit. 
 
Proposition 4: If parties bargaining over wage and profit share, 
strategic outsourcing will become lower with higher labor union’s 
bargaining power. 
 
Thus, the bargaining structure and the power of the labor union are crucial for the 
amount of outsourcing. The reason for this is that a stronger labor union induces 
different effects on the firm’s costs parameters.  
In  the  case  of  a  bargaining  profit  share,  the  wage  is  the  exogenous  
alternative income and does not affected by outsourcing. Thus, the relevant cost 
parameter in this approach is the distribution parameter, respectively the profit 
share. Since higher outsourcing decreases the share of profit the firm owner earned, 
due to a higher loss in case of a disagreement, there is independent of the power of 
the union an incentive for less outsourcing. However, the profit share also reflects 
the bargaining power, which means that a higher bunion bargaining power 
decreases the firms profit share, this incentive will be reinforced by a stronger labor 
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union. Therefore, higher outsourcing distributes a higher share of the profit to the 
work force and lowers the firm’s owner income. Due to this, the firm will react with 
less outsourcing, if the labor union becomes stronger. 
In  contrast,  if  the  parties  bargain  only  over  the  wage,  the  wage  is  the  cost  
parameter. Since there is only a wage moderating effect of outsourcing, if the labor 
union is sufficiently high, only in the case of a strong labor union the firm can 
realize a higher profit due to an increasing amount of outsourcing. Therefore, a 
strong labor union increases the incentive for higher outsourcing, due to lower the 
labor cost. 
 Following from this argumentation, it is straight forward to see, that the 
different bargaining structures lead to different amount of outsourcing for a given 
union’s bargaining power. Thus, we can conclude that bargaining over wages and 
profit sharing leads to less outsourcing than a classical wage bargaining. 
   
 
IV.    Conclusions 
 
The  main  goal  of  this  paper  was  to  show  the  effect  of  outsourcing  on  
workers income, if the domestic labor market is characterized by a market 
imperfection, which was modeled as a bargaining between a firm and a labor union. 
In our analysis we distinguished the approaches, where in the first case the union 
and firm negotiate only over wages, in the second case, as discussed in the political 
debate, the parties bargain over wage and profit share.  
For the first case, it has been found that outsourcing will reduce (increase) 
workers income, if the labor union’s bargaining power is sufficiently high (low). In 
contrast, we found that outsourcing will increase workers income, if the labor union 
and firm bargain over wage and profit share.  
Concerning the effect of the labor market imperfection on strategic 
outsourcing  we find  also  a  different  result.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  outsourcing  
has different effects on the firm’s costs parameter. If the parties bargain only over 
the wage level, the wage is the cost parameter. Since the impact of outsourcing on 
the wages depends on the union’s bargaining power, this will affect the optimally 
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amount of outsourcing. Here we find that due to the wage moderating (increasing) 
effect of outsourcing in the presence of a sufficiently strong labor union, 
outsourcing will become higher (lower) if the labor union’s bargaining power is 
sufficiently high (low).  
If  the  wage  and  the  profit  share  are  determined  simultaneously,  the  wage  
equals the exogenous alternative income. This means that only the profit share 
characterizes the firms cost parameter. Since the profit share is increasing in the 
power of the labor union and outsourcing, it results an incentive for less outsourcing 
and thus for a higher income of the firm. 
Due to this knowledge, we can compare the optimal amount of outsourcing 
under the different bargaining approaches. Here we find that for an equal and 
sufficiently strong labor union, the firm’s optimal investment in outsourced 
products is lower in the case of simultaneously bargained wage and profit share. 
Thus,  for lowering the fear of substitution of domestic employment,  the union has 
an incentive for adopting profit sharing as a part of the bargaining and 
compensation package.  
       
           
Appendix A: Derivation of the wage effects 
 
As the mark-up we have ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? Z
TA ??????????
????????? ????????
?????????
111
11  
and depends on the wage w  and the amount of outsourcing M . The impact of the 
base wage can be written as 2Z
ZTZTA www
???? , where 
? ?? ? www LL
MLMT 2/1 ?????? ????????  and www LL
MTZ 2??? ? . Using this we 
have 
 ? ? ? ?? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
????
?
??
?
? ??????? ????????? 11
2
2 wL
M
L
M
Z
A ww .                 (A1)      
Since 0
1
1 ???? L
M
ww
?
???  we have 0?wA  and thus 01 ?? A
wAw . 
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In  a  similar  way  we  analyze  the  impact  of  outsourcing  on  the  mark-up.  Here  we  
have 2Z
ZTZTA MMM
???? , where ? ? 21 L
LML
L
MT MMM
?????
?
??
?
? ?????? ??????  
and 2L
LMLTZ MMM
????? ? . Using these expressions, we find that  
 ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ????????????? ??????????? 111 22 LZAM .       (A2) 
From (A2) we have 
 0
??
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
MA  as 
? ?? ?
? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?????????
?????
????????
???
??
??
?
??
??
?
?
?
?
1)(1
1
2  ,         (A3) 
 which gives equation (9) by using the wage elasticity (5). QED. 
 
Appendix B: Relationship between profit sharing and outsourcing 
 
Equation (12) can be written as  
 
 ? ?MfbMV
bMV
??
??? ?? ,                                                                                    (B1) 
 
where ? ????? ??
?
??
?
??
??
????? ??????
??
1111bV . The  effect  of  outsourcing  on  
bargained profit sharing is ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?2
''
MfbMV
bMMfVMfbMf
M ??
????????
? ?? . Using 
? ? 2
2
1 cMMf ? , we can reformulate the effect of outsourcing on profit share to  
 
  ? ?? ?2
2
1
MfbMV
bMVcM
M ??
??
?
??
? ?
??
? ?? ,                                                          (B2) 
  
 
which is equation (13). QED. 
 
 
References: 
 
Anderson, S. and M. Devereux (1989): Profit Sharing and Optimal Labor 
Contracts, Canadian Journal of Economics 89, 425-433. 
 22
 
Bhagwati, J., A. Panagariya and T. N. Srinivasan (2004): The Muddles over 
Outsourcing, Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, 93-114. 
 
Cable, J. R. and F. R. FitzRoy (1980): Cooperation and Productivity: Some 
Evidence from West Germany’s Experience, Economic Analysis and Workers 
Management 14, 163-190. 
 
Cahuc, P. and A. Zylberberg (2004): Labor Economics, the MIT Press. 
 
Conyon, M. and R. Freeman (2004): Shared Modes of Compensation and Firm 
Performance: U.K. Evidence, in Card, D. R. Blundell and R. B. Freeman 
(eds): Seeking a Premier Economy: the Economic Effects of British Economy 
Reforms 1980-2000, 109-146. 
 
Danthine, J.-P. and J. Hunt (1994): Wage Bargaining Structure, Employment and 
Economic Integration, Economic Journal 104, 528-541. 
 
Estrin, S., Perotin, V., Robinson, A. and N. Wilson (1997): Profit-Sharing in OECD 
Countries: a Review and Some Evidence, Business Strategy Review 8, 27-32. 
 
Feenstra,  R.  and  G.  Hanson  (1999):  The  Impact  of  Outsourcing  and  High-
technology Capital on Wages: estimates for The United States 1979-1990, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 907-940. 
 
Freeman,  R.  B.  (1995):  Are  Your  Wages  Set  in  Beijing?,  Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 9, 15-32. 
 
Glass A. J. and K. Saggi (2001): Innovation and Wage Effects of International 
Outsourcing, European Economic Review 45, 67-85. 
 
Geischecker, I. and H. Görg (2008): Winners and Losers: A Micro-Level Analysis 
of International Outsourcing and Wages, Canadian Journal of Economics 41, 
243-270. 
 
Görg,  H.  and  A.  Hanley  (2005):  Labor  Demand  Effects  of  International  
Outsourcing: Evidence from Plant-Level Data, International Review of 
Economics and Finance 14, 365-376. 
 
Hasan,  R.,  D.  Mitra  and  R.  V.  Ramaswamy  (2007):  Trade  Reforms,  Labor  
Regulations, and Labor-Demand Elasticities: Evidence from India, Review of 
Economics and Statistics 89, 466-481. 
 
Holmlund, B. (1990): Profit Sharing, Wage Bargaining and Unemployment, 
Economic Inquiry 28, 257-268. 
 
 23
Hummels, D., D. Rapoport and K.-M. Yi (1998): Vertical Specialization and the 
Changing Nature of World Trade, Economic Policy Review 4, 79-99. 
 
Hummels,  D.,  J.  Ishii  and  K.-M.  Yi  (2001):  The  Nature  and  Growth  of  Vertical  
Specialization in World Trade, Journal of International Economics 54, 75-
96. 
 
Jerger,  J.  and  J.  Michaelis  (1999):  Profit  Sharing,  Capital  Formation  and  the  
NAIRU, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 101, 257-275. 
 
Jones, D. C. and J. Pliskin (1991): The Productivity Effects of Profit Sharing and 
Worker Representation on the Board, Working Paper Hamilton College, 
No. 91. 
 
Koskela, E. and R. Schöb (2009): Outsourcing of Unionized Firms and the Impact 
of Labor Market Policy Reforms, forthcoming in: Review of International   
Economics.     
 
Koskela, E. and R. Stenbacka (2009): Equilibrium Unemployment with 
Outsourcing under Labour Market Imperfections, Labour Economics 16, 284-
290.     
 
Kruse, D. L. (1993): Does Profit Sharing Affect Productivity?, NBER Working 
Paper, No. 4542. 
 
Lommerud, K. E., F. Meland and O. R. Straume (2009): Can Deunionization Lead 
to International Outsourcing?, Journal of International Economics 77, 109-
119. 
 
Naylor, R. (1998): International Trade and Economic Integratio when Labour 
Markets are generally unionized, European Economic Review 42, 1252-1267. 
 
Naylor, R. (1999): Union Wage Strategies and International Trade, Economic 
Journal 109, 102-125. 
 
Pendleton, A., E. Poutsma, J. van Ommeren and C. Brester (2001): Employee Share 
Ownership and Profit Sharing in the European Union, Office for Official 
Publications of the European Commission, Luxembourg. 
 
Perry, C. R. (1997): Outsourcing and Union Power, Journal of Labor Research 18, 
521-534. 
 
Pohjola, M. (1987): Profit Sharing, Collective Bargaining and Employment, 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 143, 334-342. 
 
Senses, M. Z. (2010): The Effects of Offshoring on the Elasticity of Labor Demand, 
Journal of International Economics 81, 89-98. 
 
 24
Slaughter, M. (2001): International Trade and Labor-Demand Elasticities, Journal 
of International Economics 54, 27-56. 
 
Skaksen, M. Y. and J. R. Sorensen (2001): Should Trade Unions Appreciate 
Foreign Direct Investments, Journal of International Economics 55, 379-390. 
 
Weitzman, M. L. (1987): Steady State Unemployment under Profit Sharing, the 
Economic Journal 97, 86-105. 
 
Yeats, A. (2001): Just how big is Global Production Sharing?, in S. W. Arndt and 
H. Kierzkowski (eds.): Fragmentation: New Production Patterns in the World 
Economy, Oxford University Press, New York, 108-143. 
